Determinantes da propensão ao comportamento corrupto: uma análise experimental com um mecanismo de punição
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18046/j.estger.2021.161.4335Palavras-chave:
suborno, corrupção, economia experimental, jogos não cooperativos, dados em painelResumo
Esta pesquisa buscou identificar alguns dos determinantes que explicam a propensão dos indivíduos a comportamentos corruptos, a partir de tomadas de decisão que envolvem benefícios econômicos. Para isso, um experimento econômico foi aplicado em uma amostra da população de uma universidade na cidade de Cali, na Colômbia. O projeto experimental responde aos elementos de um mecanismo de leilão de envelope fechado que envolve uma oferta de suborno. A partir de análises descritivas e de um modelo logístico de média populacional para dados não lineares em painel, evidenciou-se que o nível educacional e socioeconômico estão fortemente associados ao comportamento corrupto. Da mesma forma, verifica-se que a ameaça de criminalização reduz drasticamente a corrupção a um custo social insignificante.
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