Shareholding control configuration, corporate governance and firm value: an analysis of the Brazilian firms

Abstract

This work aims to analyze the effect of the shareholding control configuration on the effectiveness of the corporate governance system. Using regression analysis, the relationships between the type of shareholding control, the level of adoption of corporate governance practices, and firm value were explored using a sample of 160 Brazilian companies. The results indicate that a better structured corporate governance system has a positive effect on firm value, which proves its effectiveness. Furthermore, this relationship is positively moderated by majority control, and negatively by shared control. These findings indicate that shareholding control is a contingent factor on the effectiveness of adopting governance practices by firms. It is worth mentioning that firms with dispersed control exhibit greater adherence to corporate governance practices, majority control depreciates firm value, while shared and dispersed control create value. This paper contributes a categorization for shareholding control configuration and provides evidence of its key role on firm value.