Teoría de costos de transacción, formas de gobernación y los incentivos en Colombia: un estudio de caso
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.estger.2013.09.007Keywords:
costos de transacción, pago por desempeño, incentivos, formas de gobernaciónAbstract
En el presente artículo se revisa la capacidad de la teoría de costos de transacción para explicar los incentivos en la cadena de salud. Para lo anterior, se realiza a través de un estudio de caso de CPS, una aseguradora de salud en Bogotá. CPS se mueve en el ambiente de altos costos de transacción y utiliza la forma hibrida de gobernación en el nivel ambulatorio lo que está de acuerdo con la teoría. En el nivel hospitalario, a pesar de alta incertidumbre, se utiliza el mercado como forma de gobernación lo que dificulta a CPS relacionar el pago con el desempeño hospitalario. Se concluye que la teoría de costos de transacción parcialmente explica la configuración de incentivos.Downloads
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