RESEARCH INCENTIVE POLICIES: A CRITICAL REVIEW BASED ON THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (Article published in Spanish)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0123-5923(11)70172-3Keywords:
Moral hazard, research, teaching, incentive policyAbstract
Universities in Colombia initially focused on teaching. Some of them, both public and private, have reconsidered their vision and have developed policies aimed at incorporating research into their priorities. Clear mechanisms of incentives for publication have been designed for the purpose of getting faculty members involved in the production of knowledge and the divulging of results through national and international indexed journals, books based on research findings, and academic conferences and events. This article aims to highlight the value of Contract Theory in order to provide an understanding of the research incentive policy at Colombian universities, conducting a review of major theoretical contributions to moral hazard problems and discussing research incentive policies in the light of these concepts.
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