Determinantes de la propensión a comportamientos corruptos: un análisis experimental con mecanismo de castigo

José Santiago Arroyo-Mina; Milton Fabián Castaño-Muñoz; Juan Fernando Álvarez-Correa; Hollman Jurado-Barco

doi:10.18046/j.estger.2021.161.4335

Autores/as

José Santiago Arroyo-Mina Profesor - Investigador, Facultad de Administración, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia.
Milton Fabián Castaño-Muñoz Profesor, Departamento de Ciencias Básicas, Institución Universitaria Antonio José Camacho, Cali, Colombia. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5719-7092
Juan Fernando Álvarez-Correa Profesor, Departamento de Economía, Universidad del Cauca, Popayán, Colombia. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4290-023X
Hollman Jurado-Barco Gerente de Producción Autopartes, Fábrica Nacional de Autopartes (FANALCA) S.A., Cali, Colombia.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18046/j.estger.2021.161.4335

Palabras clave:

soborno, corrupción, economía experimental, juegos no cooperativos, datos panel

Resumen

En esta investigación se buscó identificar algunos de los determinantes que explican la propensión de los individuos a comportamientos corruptos, con base en la toma de decisiones que involucran beneficios económicos. Para ello, se aplicó un experimento económico en una muestra de la población de una universidad de la ciudad de Cali, Colombia. El diseño experimental responde a los elementos propios de un mecanismo de subasta a sobre cerrado que involucra una oferta de soborno. A partir de análisis descriptivos y un modelo logístico de promedio poblacional para datos de panel no lineales, se evidenció que el nivel educativo y socioeconómico se asocian fuertemente con el comportamiento corrupto. Así mismo, se encuentra que la amenaza de penalización reduce de manera drástica la corrupción a un costo social insignificante.

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